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I had a Boss once who was a devout Catholic. After finding out I was Mormon he commented that Mormons and Catholics understan each other very well because they’re the only ones who believe that their church is the ONLY true church. I think this is true to a certain extent. |
Catholic means universal. I learned that in catechism from a mean old nun. Therefore, Catholics believe their church is the universal true church. She explained that to us. |
Amen, DKL. This holier-than-thou attitude people put on for NOT believing things is so obviously self-defeating, I’m surprised it is lost on anyone. It is the same old pit stepped into by every form of perspectivism/subjectivism. |
The best political quote I have ever heard applied to religion and this concept. It asserts: “A liberal is just a conservative with more friends.” Both sides say the exact same thing; it’s just phrased differently. The conservative says, “I am right, and everyone who disagrees with me is wrong.” The liberal says, “Everyone is right - except for those who disagree with me.” It’s easy to say that Protestants do exactly what Mormons and Catholics do; they just exclude fewer people - particularly Mormons and Catholics. However, if you look closely at what most Catholics and Mormons actually believe (at the creeds themselves), it is apparent that each of these denominations allows for the possibility (actually likelihood) that “righteous” Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists, Jews, Agnostics, atheists, etc. will be covered by the atonement and grace of Christ and be rewarded in the afterlife for their devotion to their own understanding. It’s hard to say the same about most Protestants - and especially most evangelicals. Of all Christian denominations, I believe the most inclusive as to the universal impact of the atonement actually are the two who make the most obvious “only true church” claim - the Catholics and the Mormons. Try sharing that with a Southern Baptist, and watch the reaction. FWIW, I didn’t share that belief much when I lived the Deep South. |
The real maturity lies not in saying “Everybody’s right” but in saying “I think I’m right; I recognize that you think you’re right. This doesn’t mean we can’t be friends.” The first course strikes me as anything but maturity, to be honest. It’s the child on the playground who agrees with anything anyone says to fit in. They say a mind is like a parachute — it works best when it’s open. A parachute incapable of holding air is as useless as a mind incapable of holding onto a principle. |
Doesn’t the fact that a denomination exists imply that its founders found some fault with an existing denomination and made a “better” one? Also, Miranda Park Jones drives a pink car. Furthermore, don’t even the most ecumenical of denominations make restrictions on what they’ll accept as far as ordinances? For example many denominations that pride themselves on their openess reject LDS baptism while accepting a wide variety of other baptisms. It seems that the entire point of a religion is to make certain truth claims and reject others which has to set up a sitution in which they are making some level of exclusive argument, even if only implicitly. |
Amen, PDoE. It’s much easier to quote the 11th Article of Faith than to live it - with a Christlike attitude. |
DKL, I think you can atomize it or break it down further into the essential and non-essential doctrines of various churches, and examine that axis independent of the claims of “official-ness” of a given church. Very few churches other than Catholic and LDS claim to be God’s exclusive “official” church. Yet many churches which don’t claim to be God’s exclusively “official” church, have doctrines that differentiate them from other churches which they consider to be more or less essential, or at least needful enough to justify the formation of another denomination. Under the “itching ears” heading, many churches, even many of the mainline Protestant denomimations, focus as much or more on meeting the needs of their members as opposed to implementing what they believe God requires of mankind. So you’re right that if two denominations have contradicting items which both put forth as “essential” doctrine, there is a logical implication of exclusivity. Yet neither raises that item of essential-ness to a level upon which they claim “official-ness” as God’s one true church. |
FWIW, many Baptist churches as well as the chuch of Christ denomination believe in exclusivity. In fact, even though both practice baptism by immersion, neither recognizes the others’ baptisms as valid. Baptist churches tend to allow as members only those who are baptised either in their church or in another baptist church. |
Bookslinger, the distinction that I draw between beliefs that impact on salvation and beliefs that don’t impact salvation already addresses your attempted clarification. In fact, the subsection entitled, “The Salvation Impact” addresses your comment head-on. Specifically, the claim of the Catholic Church and the LDS church to “officialness” is no different from the non-Catholic and non-LDS denial of this “officialness.” It’s worth asking the non-Catholic and non-LDS church-goers whether they consider it “official” that the LDS church and the Catholic church are not the “official” church of God. |
Incidentally, it’s important to be very clear about what the LDS church and the Catholic Church are asserting about their exclusive truths and authority. This has come to the fore in the past few months because of the recent statement by the Pope on Catholic doctrine. In conversations with friends and acquaintances, I most often hear this statement characterized as a claim that Catholics have a monopoly on truth. Indeed, the media has frequently summarized the Pope’s statement by saying that it claims, “other Christian communities are either defective or not true churches and Catholicism provides the only true path to salvation.” If you google that entire sentence (putting it in quotes), you’ll get hundreds of results. Even the blog article introducing a recent Mormon Matters podcast that discussed the Pope’s statement offers that very sentence as an apparent quote from the Pope’s statement. Nowhere does this sentence occur in the Pope’s statement. Nor is it a fair characterization. The statement differentiates the Catholic Church from protestant religions and other orthodox religions based on the fact that the Church of Christ subsists in the Catholic Church, but is merely present in the others. Specifically, it states the following:
In the only passage using any cognate of the term defect, the Pope’s statement goes on to quote the Second Vatican Decree to say:
There is no notion here of a monopoly on truth. A fairer characterization of the Pope’s statement is this: While all Christian churches share in some stock of gospel truth, the Catholic Church alone contains the full compliment of gospel truths and authority. This strikes me as fairly similar to the claim made by the LDS church, though the LDS church and the Catholic Church obviously adhere to a different ensemble of truths and authorities. |
DKL, Actually the Pope’s statement looks to me to be very similar in structure to LDS claims about the Light of Christ vs The Gift of the Holy Ghost. |
or maybe enjoying the occasional presence of the Holy Ghost vs the Gift of the Holy Ghost. |
I may be lost, as usual, but you guys know I find validity in all religions that encourage us to serve each other and do good. I’ve spent a good deal of time in the Presbyterian church because of Al-Anon and AA meetings and I feel the spirit there. They are a Godly, good people who I feel are beloved of God. However, despite the crying children, also the yelling, giggling, messy children, the backbiting, the organizational paregoric, the equity issues with men, the endless imperfections of Mormonism, there is a light in our meetings that I don’t find anywhere else. That light is a clear understanding of the role of the Savior in our lives, in what He actually did for us. Also, a knowledge of where we came from, why we’re here, and where we’re going. I’m not talking about the debate about exaltation, celestial kingdom, etc., I’m talking about the fact that life goes on, there is a spirit world and it is more clearly defined in Mormonism than in any other religion because we know, we know what happens. As much as I know anything, I mean. Also, our scriptures are more comprehensive, and clearly understood. I mean just the bible. The Presbyterians have a fraction of the scripture that we have. I don’t know why their Bible contains so much less, but it does. And if you sit in on a lesson, they just do not understand gospel as we do. It’s not common, as it is in our church, although I realize that, too, is imperfect. The level of scholarship in a Mormon Sunday School (BORING as it often is) exceeds the level of scholarship in any other religion’s Sunday meeting. So, while I unashamedly find fault in our church, things that bother me, and love people of other faiths, if there’s a God, we have the most truth. |
First let me say that I completely agree with your analysis. “Exclusivity” has been given a pejorative label without realizing the universal and essential nature of it. Perhaps, however, I can add an additional layer of discourse to the issue. Not by arguing the other side, so to speak, but by broadening the notion of “truth claims”. In your analysis it seems that religious truth claims are reducible to propositional statements. I’m not so sure this holds true for many religions other than Christianity (and perhaps even some denominations within Christianity; Mormonism, for instance). In other words, to say that a religion’s measure of truthfullness is predicated on its ability to generate a series of correct propositional truth statements, negates the “religion” of many others (Buddhists, Hindus, Chinese religions, and I would argue Mormonism, to name a few) right from the start. I think this is where some of the frustration lies in the larger discourse (or at least in dialoguing with these people). These religions seem less about establishing a correct world-view; and more about living in the world in a correct way. This isn’t to say that propositional statements have no place in these traditions, but propositional statements are not given the same weight. In this light, deviation from the religious norm (what we would call “heterodoxy”) is tolerated more, and ideological coherency/systematicity is valued less. |
SmallAxe, you’ve hit the nail on the head, and exposed the implicit positivistic outlook of both me and my readers. Though most westerners (professional philosophers and otherwise) are in total denial about having a basically positivist outlook, I am unapologetically a logical positivist. Nevertheless, you’re mistaken. I have four answers to your comment: (1) In his early writings, Wittgenstein emphasized the idea that some things could only be shown and not talked about. Oddly enough, Wittgenstein devotes an entire book to talking about these things that cannot be talked about. In the end, he concedes that by his very own standards, his writing is nonsense. He nevertheless asserts that it is important nonsense. (There’s a notion that early Wittgenstein was something of a positivist, and I vehemently disagree, because a genuine positivist doesn’t entertain a distinction between important and unimportant nonsense.) In any event, the claims made by eastern religions are by no means uniquely eastern. We see them made everywhere — including among the writings of 20th century philosophers that some fancy to be positivists. The problem is that the claims aren’t actually born out by the practicers; e.g., there are huge libraries of literature written about Buddhism and Hinduism — including their own canons of scripture. It’s difficult to maintain that one can’t significantly discuss eastern religions within the framework of propositional truths when you have so many eastern religionists discussing eastern religions within the framework of propositional truths. (2) It is true that one may gain a fuller understanding of Buddhism by practicing it than by merely reading the propositional truths that describe it. But this is also true of Old Order Amish: one may gain a fuller understanding of the plain living of Old Order Amish by practicing it than by reading descriptions of it. In fact, this is trivially true of all propositional truth; e.g., one must also experience a cold in order to fully understand the propositional truths written about colds. This is simply the nature of the relationship between propositional truths and experience. Again, there’s nothing unique about eastern religions in this respect. (3) Furthermore, large parts of the scriptures of any religion are, indeed, literally nonsense when one takes them at face value, but they loosely map to enough literal meanings that they (a) impart several propositional truths at once via the literal meanings to which they map (i.e., they are analogous to mathematical functions like x + y = 16), and (b) they have a powerful aesthetic impact on the reader. Thus, people who think that Buddhist aphorisms are not propositional statements are measuring the meaning of the aphorism itself, and not the meanings to which the aphorism refers. (4) Lastly, because we can describe behaviors in general terms, we can say that they embody ideas, and ideas gain expression through propositional truths. In the end, Mormons do some things, Catholics do other things, and Buddhists do something else; substituting behavior and practice for propositional beliefs results in the same brand of exclusivity. |
Implicitly you touch on an important point about the etic observations of the outsider. The very fact that we label those of Eastern faiths “practitioners” when they do not use such a label (at least previous to Western interaction), exposes the fact that much of this discourse is shaped by the dichotomy between belief and practice; a dichotomy which may not be indigenous to these religions. At the same time, however, it does seem that these traditions make these claims themselves. What I’m saying is that you are mistaken that these religions do not bear out the observations we’ve ascribed to them (or which they self-generate). Note now, that I am not saying that propositional truths have no role in these religious traditions. Rather I’m saying that propositional truth claims do not serve the same function in terms of measuring the “truthfulness” of a religion. The Lotus Sutra, the most popular sutra in Chinese Buddhist history, opens with a description of the Buddha explaining all his past teachings as well as teachings of all Buddhas are nothing more than upaya, skillful or expedient means. In other words “doctrine” is meant to be understood functionally/performatively and not propositionally. This opening scene is followed by several chapters of anecdotes meant to illustrate this. These anecdotes contain several “lies” such as false promises of material goods for the sake of leaving a burning house, and several others. Example 2: The Vimalakirti Sutra is a text built around the story of several monks, lay people, and Bodhisattvas attempting to describe non-duality (breaking the cycle of birth and rebirth). The descriptions get more and more elaborate (and propositionally complex) until the culminating chapter where Vimalakirti is asked for his description and he remains silent as if he never heard the question (the ultimate answer, of course!). Now, one could argue that these very texts (and all the other Buddhist texts) are in some sense propositional. I would not deny that (although some Buddhists may. Zen koan’s for instance are purposefully illogical, denying the x + y = z formulation you ascribe to propositional claims. Take as an example: “Someone asked, ‘The patriarch Lu sat facing the wall. What was he trying to show?’ The master covered his ears with his hands.”). Point being, the value we give to propositional claims is not necessarily universally shared. Exclusive claims, therefore, of being the only true XYZ are either understood radically differently or are less essential to those forms of religiosity. Gernet in China and the Christian Impact provides evidence of the kind of difference I am trying to assert and you are trying to deny. Matteo Ricci, one of the early Jesuit missionaries (16th and 17th centuries) notes: “The most common opinion today amongst those who believe themselves to be the most wise is to say that these three sects [Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism] are one and the same thing and can all be observed at once. By this they deceive themselves and others too, creating the greatest confusion, for it seems to them that, where religion is concerned, the more ways there are of putting things, the better for the kingdom. And in the end, the result is just the opposite from what they hoped, for, desiring to follow all these laws, they find themselves without any and following none with all their hearts. Thus, what with some of them openly admitting their incredulity and others thinking that they believe but not truly believing most of them end up by remaining in the most profound atheism.” (64). |
In the light of Ricci’s quote above, Parley P Pratt’s description of modern Christianity (particularly the Westminster Confession version that appears to have been the focus of Joseph Smith’s opposition) as “pious atheism” is interesting. As I understand his comment, theism isn’t theism if it defines God in undefinable terms. I know that is a gross oversimplification, but I only have about 15 seconds left before I have |
SmallAxe: …propositional truth claims do not serve the same function in terms of measuring the “truthfulness” of a religion. I’m not sure how you arrived at the conclusion that I believe that propositional truth claims measure the truthfulness of any religion, eastern or western. Committing to one belief necessarily excludes others. Everything that you’ve said indicates that eastern religions do in fact have beliefs, from which it follows that they also reject some beliefs. The entire point of the actions and narratives that you describe is that they embody, portray, or demonstrate certain propositional truths and not others. Once you reject any beliefs at all (be they religious or otherwise), you’ve entered the domain of exclusivity. Your patriarch Lu passage is a perfect example the exact type of propositional truth that you say it repudiates. In other words, it’s a propositional truth truth that gains its meaning by referring to literal truths instead of embodying a literal truth. And your statement that the story is purposefully illogical is belied by your quite logical description of what the story really tries to communicate. Moreover, you’ve missed the entire point of using a mathematical formula as an example. Following Frege, I’m mapping the meaning of a function (e.g., x + y = 16) to the set of statements that satisfy it. Given the example that I’ve used, that would include 4 + 10 = 16, 3 + 13 = 16, 1 + 15 = 16, etc. Sometimes, these functions are satisfied in original and surprising ways. Again, this fits the patriarch Lu example perfectly. All you’re really talking about is a concept that philosophers call intentionality, and you seem to be supposing that intentionality grants personal beliefs some kind of exemption from the requirements of meaningful statements. It does not. |
I’m not sure how you arrived at the conclusion that I believe that propositional truth claims measure the truthfulness of any religion, eastern or western. I’m not claiming that you do. I’m not claiming it incorrect to assert that all religions make propositional claims (which by definition “exclude” others). I am claiming that religions assign different values to propositional claims; and religions which do not assign a particularly high value to them are more likely to be less systematic, more porous in terms of “membership”, and more averse to claims of being the one true religion. I would even go so far as to say that religion spoken of as a quest for truth defined propositionally reflects more of a Western philosophical heritage than a universal statement about religion itself (I’m not saying that you do this, I’m simply making a general observation). Point being, some people who are critical of the “one true” claim, do so, not because they are self contradictory (as John Hamer apparently was in your conversation), but because in their religious lives, they attribute less value to propositional statements. And your statement that the story is purposefully illogical is belied by your quite logical description of what the story really tries to communicate. You’re conflating etic and emic accounts here. The fact that I use the story in a logical manner does not make the emic account of the story such. |
Yikes DKL, your logic is making my head spin. You seem to process thoughts and concepts differently than do most other people. The method in which you “connect the dots” between concepts and between causes and effects is rare. It’s as if your brain is wired differently. Anyhoo… Another difference in structure or paradigm between us and many Protestant denominations such as Baptist, Evangelical and Pentecostal, is their affirmation that having correct doctrine/beliefs (ie, “being right”) gives them authority. Whereas we believe that having authrority “makes us “right. Before he lost his faith, one of my evangelical friends impressed me by stating that observation of one of the main differences between us and Protestants. |
Bookslinger, thanks. That’s very kind of you to say. SmallAxe, I’m not conflating etic and emic, because the story isn’t simply a pleasant bit of nonsense. Telling it has a purpose and a meaning that is experienced as such, and your explanation of it goes a long ways towards communicating it. SmallAxe: I am claiming that religions assign different values to propositional claims; and religions which do not assign a particularly high value to them are more likely to be less systematic, more porous in terms of “membership”, and more averse to claims of being the one true religion. I know that this is your key claim. I’ve stated that it is altogether beside the point, because (as I’ve stated above), “we can say that they embody ideas, and ideas gain expression through propositional truths. In the end, Mormons do some things, Catholics do other things, and Buddhists do something else; substituting behavior and practice for propositional beliefs results in the same brand of exclusivity.” SmallAxe: To assert that “the house is on fire” (from the Lotus Sutra), is not to assert the “falseness of the entire set of statements that disagrees with that assertion.” Ultimately, there is no fire, there is no house. The house, fire, and material wealth promised outside the house are simply tools (literally a “trick” in Japanese) aimed at certain realization. The fact that the phrase, “the house is on fire,” is used instead of (say) “I ate a Big Mac for breakfast” or “Oscar the Grouch lives in a trash can” indicates that it has a meaning that points to some things and excludes others. This latest comment changes your fixation from intentional meanings to a fixation on sharp differences between literal and figurative usage, as though figurative uses that are wildly different from literal interpretations somehow elude the characteristics of other meaningful assertions. That said, a lot of things said in religions are simply nonsense intended to have some emotional impact based on the aesthetic characteristics of the story. We should lose no opportunity to point out that such sayings are, indeed, cognitively meaningless and have no truth value. SmallAxe: Point being, some people who are critical of the “one true” claim, do so, not because they are self contradictory. I’m not claiming that they are being self-contradictory. I’m not even claiming that they are being hypocritical. I’m saying that they mistake the logical consequences of their beliefs, which harbor latent exclusiveness by their very nature. Thus, my aim here isn’t to defend exclusionary truths, but to point out that its impossible for truths (whether explicitly propositional or embodied in behavior or actions) to be anything but exclusionary. |
I don’t know from all the big words, but two things occur to me: Catholics claim authority as well. They also believe in the existence of the spirit world, I wonder if their perversion of the baptismal covenant, ie little kids, isn’t part of this belief. Like we believe if a person isn’t a member they go to a different place in the spirit world. Well, Catholics believe this also. Purgatory, as my friend, the monk, explained to me, is simply a holding place in the spirit world. It’s interesting that Catholics hold many very true beliefs. They also believe that something significant happened in Gethsemane, although they don’t totally understand it (who does?). They call it “the rapture.” The thing I found in my study of religions and near death experiences is that we are ALL (all religions) more alike than we are different. The difference is more the outside, inside, all Christian religions teach doing good to others and serving God. Bottom line, that’s the most important thing anyway. |
Thus, my aim here isn’t to defend exclusionary truths, but to point out that its impossible for truths (whether explicitly propositional or embodied in behavior or actions) to be anything but exclusionary. I agree with this (except for possibly the fact that you defend truth claims as exclusionary purely on a propositional basis in your original post). I know that this is your key claim. I’ve stated that it is altogether beside the point, because (as I’ve stated above), “we can say that they embody ideas, and ideas gain expression through propositional truths. In the end, Mormons do some things, Catholics do other things, and Buddhists do something else; substituting behavior and practice for propositional beliefs results in the same brand of exclusivity.” I agree with the universal necessity of exclusivity, but I disagree that all exclusivities are the same (i.e., “same brand”). I’m not making a point here about exclusivity on the basis of practice versus exclusivity on the basis propositional truth statements; but about the differing nature of exclusivity based on differing values of propositional statements (thereby refering back to your original argument). East Asian Buddhists have historically ascribed a functional role to many (but not all) propositional truth claims (this may or may not be directly related to “practice”, because the purpose here is to get you somewhere which may or may not be involved in how Buddhism is practiced). This leads to a greater openness in terms of inter-religious perceptions (evidenced by the Ricci quote above), and a higher tolerance for propositional contradictions/inconsistencies. Do they still make exclusive claims? Of course. Is it the “same brand”? Not in my store. |
SmallAxe: I agree with the universal necessity of exclusivity, but I disagree that all exclusivities are the same. I address this square on when in the section sub-titled “The Salvation Impact.” SmallAxe: This leads to a greater openness in terms of inter-religious perceptions It doesn’t. What leads to a greater openness for inter-religious perceptions is the recognition of a permanent absence of a religious majority. That’s how ancient Persia got freedom of religion. That’s how Europe got it, and that’s how the United States got it. Read all about how the absence of a durable majority in any area leads to tolerance right here in Federalist #10. As I state in my blog post:
You’re implicit disparagement of certain religions based on their alleged propensity to lead to a lower level of openness in terms of inter-religious perceptions is evidence that you do not have as pluralistic an outlook as perhaps you should. I’m reminded of something that the English philosopher A. J. Ayer wrote about his own moral outlook. He was an atheist, and so people constantly accused him of being immoral or amoral. He wrote that he had very strong moral passions, and that he was anxious that other people share them. He just didn’t base those passions on religion. For some reason nowadays, would-be sophisticates deem it less mature to have strong moral passions, especially when they’re based on religion. Everyone wants to talk about how fanatics killed hundreds at Mountain Meadows and thousands at the Twin Towers, when historically, it’s been the dispassionate governments that have proven far more dangerous than religion and terrorism combined. Shoot, in our own lifetime, Janet Reno ordered attacks that lead to the deaths of 80 Americans — many of them innocent women and children. If she’d have been a cabinet official in a Muslim country, protesters would call such an attack (which basically wiped out a religion) genocide. |
I think my last comment got caught in your filter, or for some other reason it didn’t take. |
When you’re ready to continue the discussion fish my comment out of your filter. I tried re-constructing it and posting it. It didn’t take. |